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The Outlook for Non-Military Expenditures
AN ANALYSIS of the financial task of the federal government
during the war would be decidedly incomplete without some
understanding of the probable level of non-military expendi-
tures during the next two or three years. Comprising all
items of federal expenditure, excluding statutory debt re-
tirement, other than those incurred directly in connection
with the war, they totaled some billion in the fiscal year
1940, when defense outlays amounted to only $i.6 billion.
They declined in 1941, the first year of the defense program,
to approximately $7 billion, and to about $6.4 billion for
the fiscal year 1942. In the federal budget for the fiscal year
1943, as presented by President Roosevelt to Congress on
January 7, 1942, non-military expenditures were estimated
at approximately $6.i billion. In the fiscal year they
were approximately one-third the total for the fiscal year
1940.
Although non-military expenditures amounted to only
about one-fifth of total federal outlays for the fiscal year
1942, and will probably amount to less than one-tenth in
1943, they have an importance for our problem that tran-
scends their relative magnitude. From the standpoint of the
taxpayer, they have psychological implications of the greatest
significance, as can be seen by the incessant demand during
the last eighteen months in the press and by such organiza-
tions as the National Economy League for radical curtail-
ment. It is easy to understand that the sacrifices necessitated
by the emergency will be borne more cheerfully by taxpayers
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if they feel every reasonable effort is being made to reduce
all expenditures not absolutely essential to the war.
From the standpoint of the successful prosecution of the
war, non-military expenditures have a twofold importance.
To the extent that they are spent on scarce materials, equip-
ment, and skilled labor, which might be diverted to military
production, they must be considered as competitive with the
war program, just as similar activities on the part of private
industry are. As will be demonstrated below, their signifi-
cance in this connection is not great. Of greater importance
is the fiscal or budgetary aspect of these expenditures. Thus,
although non-military outlays will account for a relatively
small proportion of total expenditures, they will contribute
substantially to the federal deficits. Any reduction in these
expenditures will, therefore, lessen the existing and prospec-
tive dangers of inflation.
Fortunately for our analysis, the theoretical side of this
problem has been greatly simplified by the rapid unfolding
of events during the last few months. In the early stages of
the defenseeffort, while considerable slackstillexisted
throughout our economy, many economists could argue with
sincere conviction that curtailment of federal non-defense
activities would be both unwarranted and unwise. They felt
that, until a state of full employment had been reached, no
useful purpose would be served and that the growth in
national output would be checked and the morale of the
nation impaired by throwing large numbers of governmental
employees and relief beneficiaries out of work. This argument
strongly supported the natural resistance of an entrenched
bureaucracy to such a move, as well as the expressed deter-
mination of the President to achieve the defense goal with-
out the sacrifice of any social objectives for which the New
Deal had fought so vigorously.
Today the picture is quite different. The United States is
now engaged in an all-out war, and the pressure of shortages
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more apparent. Moreover, the threat of inflation, formerly
viewed as a remote contingency, is now seen as a danger almost
as real as the striking power of the German army. Under
such circumstances, the theoretical economic argument against
curtailment has become largely irrelevant. We are already
face to face with the necessity of choosing between substantial
curtailment in federal non-military activities or being satis-
fied with something less than full efficiency in our war effort.
There is now no reasonable argument, theoretical or practi-
cal, against reducing non-military outlays, as far as is con-
sistent with maintaining the efficiency of our governmental
organization and the morale of the country.
In attempting to analyze this problem, we are faced at the
outset with the very real difficulty of drawing a sharp dis-
tinction between military expenditures and those which
properly may be classed as non-military. The figures pre-
pared by the Bureau of the Budget (Table 24) may be ac-
cepted as the official classification of military and non-military
expenditures, but even these are admittedly rough and in-
exact. Included in many of the so-called non-military items
are substantial outlays which are directly or indirectly con-
nected with defense and war activities. For example, a large
part of the work of the regular governmental departments,
such as the State Department, the Treasury, and the Depart-
ment of Agriculture, is devoted directlyfurthering the
war program, although officially classified as non-military.
In addition, numerous public works, listed in the non-
military category, are being undertaken in connection with
the military program. Even a substantial percentage of the
work relief activity might properly be considered a contribu-
tion to the war.
The other side of the picture is the indisputable fact that
nearly every governmental bureau is attempting to justify its
existence by demonstrating its essential importance to the
war effort. While admitting that a successful prosecution of
the war could be seriously jeopardized by the reduction or340 FISCAL PLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR
elimination of certain non-military outlays, citizens may still
maintain that many are not essential for the achievement of
this goal, and that some of the claims in this connection
are grossly exaggerated.
Table 24 indicates clearly that a substantial proportion of








Interest on public debt i,iii 1,260 1,750
Transfers to trust accounts 325 375 299
Tax refunds 90 94 87
Veterans' pensions & benefits 553 555 590
Social security payments 423 473 538
Total contractual 2,502 2,757 3,264
Non-Contractual
General public works 703 651 578
Work relief (WPA) 1,285 882 480
Aids to youth 347 251 100
Benefits to agriculture 1,199b 976 85.1
Regular government departments 831 go8 841
Supplemental items as
Total non-contractual 4,501 3,686 2,878
Total 7,003 6,443 6,142
This tabulation follows in general the classification used by the Bureau of
the Budget, but has been modified somewhat in form in order to distinguish
between contractual and non-contractual payments. Data forfiscalyears
1941 and 1942 are from the Treasury Department, press release, July 2, 1942.
The estimates for the fiscal year 1943arefrom President Roosevelt's budget
message to Congress, Jan. 7, 1942.
The compilation prepared by the Bureau of the Budget shows a net figure
of $880 million for Benefits to Agriculture in the fiscal year 1941. This figure
was attained by deducting from total expenditures of million an item
of $319millionrepresenting a return of surplus funds from governmental
corporations. The total includes regular expenditures by the Department of
Agriculture.OUTLOOK FOR NON-MILITARY EXPENDITURES 341
certain important items are of mandatory or contractual
nature; e.g., interest on the public debt, transfers to trust
accounts, and tax refunds. Interest payments are not only
obligatory, but the total is almost certain to rise steadily and
appreciably during the next two or three years along with
an expansion of the public debt. For the fiscal year 1943 total
interest payments are estimated at $1,750 million against
$1,260 million for the fiscal year 1942. If the war continues
into 1944, total interest payments could easily reach $2,500
million annually. Of a somewhat similar mandatory character
are veterans' pensions and benefits and social security pay-
ments. Both are largely contractual and probably cannot be
curtailed, although the second item may decline moderately
with less unemployment. The total for all mandatory and
contractual items is estimated at approximately billion
for the fiscal year 1943, and probably will rise to almost $4.0
billion in 1944, if the war continues.
The remaining items are classified as non-contractual be-
cause they do not involve continuing fixed obligations from
one fiscal year to the next, and therefore are very largely
dependent for their existence upon annual appropriations by
Congress. Totaling about billion for the fiscal year 1942,
and estimated at about $2.9 for the fiscal year 1943, they con-
stitute the only areas in which curtailments seem reasonably
feasible during the war. A reduction of about $Boo million
was achieved in the fiscal year 1942 compared with 1941,
and, if the budget estimates for 1943 are adhered to, a fur-
ther cut of approximately $8oo million is in prospect.
An examination of the non-contractual items from the
standpoint of their utilization of scarce resources which may
be essential to military production reveals that merely a small
proportion can be so classified. Most of the outlays listed
under general public works are of this general character, but
the other items include merely an insignificant amount of
such expenditures.
There can be little argument against all possible curtail-342 FISCAL PLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR
ment of outlays on general public works for the duration,
except as they may be of prime importance for defense. Ex-
penditures in this category amounted to $651 million for the
fiscal year 1942, and are estimated at $578 million for
A substantial part of the 1942 total (various electric power
projects as well as the special 'defense' highway appropriation
of $170 million) was appropriated by Congress on the
ground that it was important for defense. On the other hand,
at least two-thirds of the total of $651 million, including
expenditures for flood control, improvement of rivers and
harbors, reclamation projects, general highway grants, etc.,
have only the most remote connection with defense, and
were justified very largely because the work was already in
progress and stopping would involve waste as well as breach
of faith.
In brief, we believe that general public works expenditures
for the fiscal year 1943,nowestimated at $578 million, might
be at least halved without sacrificing any important war ob-
jectives.
Work relief is accounted for almost entirely today by the
activities of the Work Projects Administration, and amounted
to $882 million in the fiscal year 1942 as compared with al-
most $1.3 actually expended in 1941. In his budget message
of January 7, 1942, President Roosevelt announced his in-
tention of reducing this item in the fiscal year 1943 to $480
million, but the Congressional appropriation for this pur-
pose has pared the amount down to $280 million.' Although
the WPA provided employment in 1941 for approximately
one million workers, probably not more than a fraction of
1 per cent could be considered skilled workers of a type essen-
tial to the war effort. Furthermore, the legal authorization
for this activity requires that at least 8O per cent of total
outlays be expended on wages, and only the balance on
materials and equipment. It seems clear that the WPA com-
petes in merely a minor degree with military production.
Indeed by employing more than two hundred thousand work-OUTLOOK FOR NON-MILITARY EXPENDITURES 343
ers in preparing emergency airports, building military roads,
etc., it has been contributing positively to defense.
Many advocates of governmental economy in non-military
items have argued that the WPA should be eliminated now
that we are rapidly approaching full employment. Careful
study, however, shows that the solution is not so simple.
According to statements by WPA officials, this organization
in 1941 was providing employment for not more than half
of those on the rolls and certified by proper authorities as
eligible for relief work. The total of workers so certified de-
clined from about 3.5 million to approximately 2.2 million
during the twelve months ended July i, 1941, but the decline
since that date has probably been at a slower rate. Moreover,
the average age of WPA workers has been rising rapidly
and is now stated to be over 43 years. The clear implication
is that the WPA is tending more and more to include only
those who are relatively unemployable from the standpoint
of private industry and military production. In other words,
elimination of the WPA would throw a large number out
of work, a great many of whom would find great difficulty
in obtaining other employment even in the face of a large
shortage of younger and more skilled labor.
The other side of the picture is that the outright need of
most WPA workers is undoubtedly mucb less today than it
was one or two years ago. It is probably safe to say that, in
the great majority of cases, members of their families are
now employed and are in a better position to assist them
financially. Thus, it seems reasonable to assume that a con-
scientious effort to weed out all who can find other employ-
ment, and all who would not be destitute if unemployed
would further reduce relief rolls drastically during the next
two or three years without causing much actual hardship.
On the whole, we believe that the $280 million now appro.
priated for this service by Congress for the fiscal year 1943
should provide adequately for the great bulk of semi-unem-
ployables who would otherwise be destitute, but we doubt344 FISCAL PLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR
that the total could be reduced much below this figure with-
out creating real hardship for this group and without some
loss of efficiency in the war effort.
A drastic curtailment of expenditures listed under aids to
youth presents a less difficult problem. Amounting to $251
million in the fiscal year 1942, they include the activities
of the Civilian Conservation Corps and the National Youth
Administration. Both were products of depression and both
undoubtedly have served laudable social purposes. N ever-
theless, neither seems essential under present conditions, and
the nation canillafford the cost from either afiscal
standpoint or that of the loss of young manhood that might
otherwise be available to the war effort. We believe that
the activities of the Civilian Conservation Corps could be
suspended for the duration without any detriment to our
war effort, and those of the National Youth Administration
reduced to a point where it would be little more than an
agency for directing and training young men and women for
employment in industry.2 A general conclusion of this kind
was implied in the reduction to only $ioo million in the
1943budget,and President Roosevelt's statement that proba-
bly not even this amount would actually be needed.
Benefits to agriculture are the most difficult to discuss in-
telligently within a brief compass because governmental pol-
icy is in such a state of rapid flux. Amounting to $967 million
in the fiscal year 1942,theydo not include loans to farmers
by various governmental corporations and agencies, such as
the Commodity Credit Corporation and the Reconstruction
Finance Corporation.
The great bulk of the expenditures in this category has
been accounted for by three items: soil conservation pay-
ments, parity payments, and food and cotton stamp plans.
The whole complex system was evolved during a period of
plenty when agriculture was one of the more depressed seg-
ments of the national economy. Soil conservation payments
arose primarily to induce growers to reduce the acreageOUTLOOK FOR NON-MILITARY EXPENDITURES 345
planted to leading surplus crops and thus create an artificial
scarcity, and secondarily to improve the soil. Parity payments
were evolved to pay farmers direct cash subsidies represent-
ing the difference between the prices actually received for
their principal crops and theoretical parity prices, based upon
1909—13 average levels. The food and cotton stamp plans
were created for the dual purpose of disposing of surplus
commodities and providing inexpensive food and clothing
to needy families.
With all this machinery in force, we have suddenly dis-
covered that we are no longer in an era of plenty but have
now reverted, at least temporarily, to an economy of scarcity.
Meanwhile, the Department of Agriculture has been strug-
gling to reorient itself to the changed state of affairs, and
is already urging increased output in many lines rather than
a general condition of artificial scarcity. Although, as pointed
out in Chapter 2, there is little likelihood of serious shortages
in our principal food supplies, prices of all farm products
have risen sharply during the last year. Cash farm income for
1941 is estimated at nearly $ii billion and may approach
$13 billion in These figures compare with an average
level of $5.9 billion in 1931—35 and $8.2 billion in 1936—40.
Since the price mechanism is now operating strongly in favor
of agriculture, it is progressively difficult to justify a con-
tinuance of these subsidies.
Because political influences are almost certain to prevent
the imposition of unduly low price ceilings on farm products,
and because Lend-Lease appropriations are providing what
is, in effect, a tremendous subsidy for the disposal of agricul-
tural products, and consequently for the maintenance of
agricultural prices, we believe that the price mechanism itself
should furnish sufficient incentive for adequate agricultural
production during the emergency. Under present circum-
stances, these farm benefits serve no useful purpose from the
standpoint of winning the war and relatively little from that
of any other rational social objective. Instead, they represent346 FISCAL PLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR
little more than excess spending power of a highly inflation-
ary character which is being injected into the economy. We
therefore conclude that, with the exception of some minor
administrative outlays, the entire program of agricultural
benefits could be eliminated with no detriment to the war
effort and with full justice to our farm population. That
no such drastic action is now contemplated by the Adminis-
tration was made clear by President Roosevelt's budget
message in which total expenditures for agricultural benefits
in the fiscal year 1943 were estimated at $854 million against
actual expenditures of $976 million in 1942.
As a matter of fact, the elimination of all agricultural bene-
fit payments in the fiscal year 1943 would probably prove
impossible, because a substantial proportion will be made
in compliance with contracts entered into with farmers in
the calendar year 1941, and to eliminate them would involve
a breach of contract. This means that action would have to
be taken in the calendar year 1942 to eliminate such con-
tractual payments in the fiscal year 1944.
The only other important item in our list is that covering
the cost of maintaining the regular peacetime functions of
the federal government. The cost amounted to $908 million
in the fiscal year 1942, and is estimated at $841 million for
1943. Although it has tended to rise year by year as bureaus
and activities have multiplied, estimating what economies
might be achieved without impairing efficiency is very diffi-
cult.Furthermore, becauseofthe entrenched political
strength of every government bureau once established, econ-
omies in this field will not come without tremendous pres-
sure. We know also that there will be strong pressure for
increased expenditures in many departments because of cx-
panded defense activities and the upward trend of all costs,
particularly living costs in Washington. On the whole, we
do not believe any substantial net reduction in this item
can reasonably be expected. About all one can hope is thatOUTLOOK FOR NON-MILITARY EXPENDITURES 347
the total will be maintained at approximately the present level
during the war, although moderate savings might be achieved
in the fiscal year 1943.
The above analysis reveals that in only two categories in
the non-defense expenditure totals could substantial savings
in excess of those now contemplated in the 1943budgetbe
achieved. An elimination of the entire program of agricul-
tural benefits would mean a further saving of some $8oo
million, and some $250-300 million might be saved from
the total allocated to general public works. We believe that
these combined savings of about $i•1billion could be at-
tained without any detriment to our war effort; also that
some minor savings, aggregating perhaps $200-300 million,
in several of the other non-contractual categories are possi-
ble without any sacrifice of efficiency in the operations of
the federal government.
The suggested savings would mean that total non-military
expenditures could be reduced to slightly underbillion,
whereas the budget estimate was $6.i billion for '943. On
the whole, $5 billion seem to be the lowest level that, from
a practical standpoint, one might hope to attain for these
expenditures. Even if this goal should be achieved in the
fiscal year 1943,wecan be sure that rapidly rising interest
costs alone would lead to higher totals in ensuing years if
the war continues.
What are the actual prospects for achieving all or any part
of these suggested savings during the next year or two? Some
months ago there was a general attitude of defeatism regard-
ing this prospect, but the atmosphere has recently changed
in marked degree. The growing fear of inflation and the
struggle to find new sources of revenue are exerting steadily
increasing pressure in the direction of governmental econ-
omy. The forceful statements by the Secretary of the Treas-
ury bear eloquent witness to the changed attitude of the
administration. Another notable straw in the wind was the
recent action of Congress in eliminating the Civilian Con-FISCAL PLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR
servation Corps, and sharply reducing the appropriation for
the Work Projects Administration.
Partly because certain economies will take place automati-
cally and partly because of the rising general pressure for
economy, we believe that actual non-military expenditures
in 1943 will probably be somewhat lower than the budget
estimate of $6.i billion. If the war continues, the outlook
is for an appreciably higher total in the fiscal year 1944,
unless a substantial part of the possible savings indicated
above should be achieved. With interest charges certain to
rise rapidly, and with a probable increase in general costs,
about the best one could hope for would be a level some-
where in the neighborhood of that now contemplated for the
fiscal year 1943.
State and Local Expenditures
Although not a central element in our problem, the outlook
for expenditures by state and local governmental bodies is
sufficiently important to require a few brief comments. In
the first place, they are important because of their very mag-
nitude. Their total averaged approximately $9 billion annu-
ally in recent years, or almost the same as total federal out-
lays in the immediate pre-defen.se period.4 They are also
important so far as they compete with the war effort for scarce
and essential resources.
Fortunately for the fiscal outlook of the nation, state and
local budgets as a whole are fairly well in balance at present.
If substantial deficits were being incurred or were likely
in the near future, we would have to reckon with an in-
flationary influence in addition to that created by the fed-
eral deficits. If, on the other hand, large surpluses pile up
in these political subdivisions either from smaller expendi-
tures or larger revenues, savings will be created that will
act as an offset to the excess purchasing power being in-
jected into the economy by the federal deficits. Finally, if
local taxes are reduced hand in hand with a curtailment ofOUTLOOK FOR NON-MILITARY EXPENDITURES 349
expenditures, the over-all tax burden will obviously be
lightened.
The experience of the first World War does not provide
any reason for optimism concerning the prospect for curtail-
ing state and local expenditures. During that period they
rose steadily and substantially. However, the total in 1913
amounted to only about $2.2 billion, and was accounted for
very largely by essential services that could not be eliminated,
such as police and fire protection, water supply, and schools.
The expansion during the war years was caused mainly by
the rapid rise in prices and in the cost of living.
The present situation differs considerably. Included in the
annual total, about $9 billion, are substantial items which
cannot be considered absolutely essential, some of which will
tend to decline automatically under the conditions created
by the war. The first is the construction and maintenance of
public works. This item totaled almost exactly $2 billion for
the fiscal year 1939, and was divided approximately two-
thirds for new construction and one-third for maintenance.5
Just as we have seen in the case of federal public works, this
item is almost certain to decline under the influence of priori-
ties in scarce materials and shortages in skilled labor. An-
other restraining influence may come from a federal prohibi-
tion against the creation of debt for such purposes by state
and local authorities. As a rough guess, the total of such out-
lays may be somewhat less than $i billion in the fiscal year
1943, and should not rise above that level during the war.
Another important category comprises relief, public assist-
ance, and unemployment compensation. It totaled approxi-
mately $i.8 billion in the fiscal year 1939 and declined
slightly in the fiscal year 1940. Direct and work relief ac-
counted for about $i billion, unemployment compensation
for about $500 million, and public assistance (provision for
the aged poor, dependent children, and the blind) for the
balance. The outlook for relatively full employment should
substantially reduce outlays for direct and work relief and350 FISCAL PLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR
unemployment compensation. Smaller declines are likely in
expenditures on public assistance. In all, we estimate that the
total outlays in this category 'will fall to not more than $1
billion in the fiscal year 1943.
Total interest payments, which amounted to about $700
million in the fiscal year 1940,maydecline slightly if out-
standing debt is reduced by recurring surpluses. Not much
reduction can be expected, however, especially if interest
rates advance.
In essential services, such as public education, on which
slightly more than $2 billion is expended annually, police
protection and fire protection, no savings are expected. On
the contrary, these items are likely to increase in cost hand
in hand with rising prices and wages, just as they did in
World War I. On the whole, we believe that for each of the
next two or three years, total state and local expenditures
are likely to average between $ibillionand $1.5billion
below the levels of the immediate pre-defense period, if the
current advance in general costs is held within reasonable
limits.
The outlook for state and local tax revenues is also mod-
erately encouraging. More than 90 per cent of local revenues,
or approximately $4.5 billion, is derived from property taxes.
This is a highly stable source of revenue, but will normally
tend to expand with rising national income because of the
decline in delinquent tax payments. Approximately 70per
cent of state tax revenues is derived from excises, such as
on general sales, motor fuel and vehicles, payrolls, and liquor.
About 20 per cent comes from corporate and individual in-
come, and estate and inheritance taxes. All these sources can
be expected to show satisfactory returns during the period
of high national income, despite a probable tendency of
certain excises, such as on motor fuel, to decline as a result
of rationing.
Thus, unless tax rates are sharply cut, substantial surpluses
in state and local budgets seem a reasonable expectation. TheOUTLOOK FOR NON-MILITARY EXPENDITURES S51
effect of such budget surpluses would be to withdraw a
roughly equivalent amount of excess purchasing power from
circulation and to serve as an offset to the inflationary in-
fluence of the excess federal expenditures. The effect would
be much the same whether these surpluses are invested in
Savings Bonds, or merely left as idle cash balances in banks.
If, however, they are used to retire local debt, or if state and
local taxes are reduced, additional purchasing power will
remain in the hands of the public and will tend to augment
the federal government's problem of coping with inflation.
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